

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040031-1

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JPRS L/8864

14 January 1980

Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 2/80)



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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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ALGERIA

ALGERIAN-SOVIET COOPERATION IN TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMIC MATTERS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Nov 79 pp 3009, 3010

[Article: "Algerian-Soviet Cooperation Extends to Various Sectors of Technology and the Economy"]

[Text] The ceremonies of the 25th anniversary of the initiation of the armed revolution of 1 November 1954 included a sizable military parade in Algiers, all the more noticed as there had been none of them for the previous 10 years. The commentators did not fail on this occasion to note the Soviet origin of most of the materiel outfitting the Algerian army and to stress the scope of Soviet military cooperation in Algeria.

In the civilian sector Soviet cooperation certainly does not have this quasi-exclusive nature. Rather, Soviet cooperation is in competition with that of several industrialized countries, of the East as well as of the West, without having pre-eminence. Soviet cooperation is however sufficiently important and diversified for economic, scientific, technical, or social events to often recall its existence. Thus, last week, in connection with the agreement for the supply of alumina which Algeria signed with Jamaica, we had to mention the cooperation agreement signed by Algeria with the USSR in 1976 for the building of an aluminum plant at M'Sila (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS [MTM] of 2 November 1979, p 2942).

An over-all survey of Soviet-Algerian technical-economic cooperation was made by Andrey Slivinsky, counselor for economic affairs at the USSR embassy in Algeria, and released by the local office of the Novosti press agency on the occasion of the 16th International Fair of Algiers in September 1979. We reproduce below this interesting document almost in its entirety.

Soviet-Algerian cooperation is premised on an intergovernmental basis whose principal instrument is the Permanent Intergovernmental Soviet-Algerian Committee for Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation (established on 7 March 1969). The resolutions approved by this organ find their embodiment in the concrete realizations of Soviet-Algerian cooperation.

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In accordance with intergovernmental agreements, draft agreements, and other documents, the Soviet Union lends Algeria its economic and technical assistance in construction, the expansion and reconstruction of nearly 100 different projects involving several fields of the Algerian economy among which the principal ones are the following: Iron and steel, mechanical construction, the chemical and gas industry, geological prospecting, hydraulics, agriculture, the training of Algerian cadres, and public health.

Iron and steel holds the most important place in the technical cooperation between the two countries. The El Hadjar complex built with the assistance of the USSR is an excellent illustration of same, the annual capacity of one converter plant totaling 1.1 million tons. Projects anticipating the increase of this plant's annual capacity to 2 million tons of steel are being completed.

The first of the projects falling within the framework of the expansion of El Hadjar--the rolling mill with a capacity of 540,000 tons of rolled steel a year--was started up in 1978. The exploitation of other units of the plant will enable Algeria to hold one of the leading places in the iron and steel sector in Africa.

With the assistance of Soviet organs a number of units in the mining sector were built and put into service: The Algerian "Ismail" mercury plant whose production is more than twice that of the plan (317 tons of mercury a year) and thanks to which Algeria is now one of the leading producers and exporters of mercury; the lead-zinc buddle at El Abed, the only mining industry enterprise of its kind in the country.

In the energy field the Annaba III thermal power plant which plays the principal role in the electric energy supply of the eastern regions of Algeria is the most important project of Soviet-Algerian cooperation in this field.

The plate glass unit in Oran is the only producer of sheet glass in Algeria. Its products are greatly appreciated in Algeria.

The Soviet Union also lends its technical assistance to Algeria in prospecting and exploration of primary metal and refractory materials, rare metals, celestite, and other minerals as well as of underground water tables.

Nineteen Soviet facilities were involved in oil and gas drilling projects.

In hydrology 170 water wells were bored with the assistance of specialized Soviet organs and four dams with a total capacity of 8.5 million cubic meters were built--enough to irrigate 2,000 hectares of land.

Education is another sector where Soviet-Algerian cooperation has yielded excellent results. Three advanced schools were opened with Soviet assistance. They have trained 5,000 highly qualified engineers and technicians. Thirty other schools of professional training are operating in the country. These schools, established with Soviet aid, have turned out more than 18,000 skilled workers for the Algerian economy during the years of cooperation.

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In the field of public health Soviet-Algerian cooperation has grown considerably. Today nearly 500 Soviet physicians are working in 40 hospitals in 30 Algerian cities. In 1978 alone they cared for more than 2 million Algerian citizens in dispensaries, hospitalized 200,000 patients, and performed 120,000 operations.

Soviet-Algerian technical-economic cooperation involves all fields as can be seen. It is growing successfully and has good prospects. New trends have appeared in the past few years: The construction of the complex of heavy mechanical construction plants, metallurgical aluminum units, energy projects, and the construction of rental housing.

Numerous and Significant Examples

The NOVOSTI press agency followed Andrey Slivinsky's article with a few examples slated to illustrate the joint efforts of Algeria and the USSR.

Iron and steel.--The metal complex of El Hadjar is the principal project of Soviet-Algerian cooperation in this field. It is the leading industry in Algeria. The core of the complex is the iron and steel mill built with Soviet assistance and which produces 410,000 tons of steel a year, that is, 10 times more than Algeria was producing in a year before its independence. The putting into service of the second stage of the plant will have special importance, for it will make it possible to increase production fivefold. By virtue of that fact Algeria will be one of the top-ranking countries in Africa in terms of development of the iron and steel sector. Let us note that the share of the Soviet Union's participation in the establishment of capacities for various types of production is 100 percent for coke, 70 percent for cast iron, 93 percent for steel, and 45 percent for rolled steel.

Geological prospecting.--Soviet experts have contributed to the establishment of the national geological service of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria. As a result of joint efforts, dozens of new deposits have been explored. Many of them are already being exploited or are about to be so. Among them are mercury deposits,--estimates of whose reserves are not being increased sixfold--zinc and lead deposits, baryta deposits, and those of antimony, wolfram, and other useful minerals. Promising supplementary prospecting has been undertaken in the zones of already exploited deposits. This has made it possible for mining enterprises on the point of closing for lack of reserves to resume profitable operations.

Nonferrous metallurgy.--The putting into service of the "Ismail" mining operation with Soviet assistance has made Algeria one of the largest producers of mercury. In the village of El Abed located in the extreme westerly region of the country a lead enrichment plant with a capacity of 2,000 tons of ore a day was built. Furthermore, as indicated earlier, an agreement was signed between the USSR and Algeria bearing on cooperation in the construction of an aluminum plant at M'Sila with an annual capacity of 140,000 tons susceptible to be increased to 300,000 tons. New horizons are also being discovered on

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this score in bilateral economic relations with the drafting by Soviet entities of a technical-economic report on the development of the nonferrous metallurgy of Algeria.

Oil and gas industry.--For more than 10 years there has been cooperation between the two parties in this very important branch of the Algerian economy, the branch supplying energy and petrochemical items and providing Algeria with the largest amount of its foreign exchange. Soviet experts of SONATRACH have organized prospecting projects in geology and oil and gas deposits in Algeria's Sahara and Atlas regions while Soviet oil workers participate directly in improving the deposits. A large amount of Soviet equipment has been shipped to SONATRACH, including about 20 powerful pieces of boring equipment for drilling for oil at great depth.

Hydraulics and agriculture.--Within the framework of Soviet-Algerian cooperation, plans for about 20 irrigation dams have been drafted and four dams have been built making possible the regular irrigation of fertile lands in the mountainous Kabylie region. The important work accomplished in the field of water distribution by the Algerian organs with the active assistance of Soviet hydrogeologists has made it possible to use the immense reserves of fresh water located under the sands of the Sahara.

Training cadres.--The National Institute of Petroleum, Gas, and Chemicals has been in operation for more than 10 years in the city of Boumerdes. A sizable group of Soviet professors has been teaching 2,500 Algerian students. The diploma-holders of the Boumerdes school (and they already number more than 2,000) now lend their assistance throughout Algeria. There is another national institute in Boumerdes--that of light industry. Also established with the assistance of the USSR, it almost entirely meets the needs in skilled specialists of the textile, footwear, and food industries of Algeria. There has been added to the advanced and secondary system of Algeria--again with the assistance of the Soviet Union--a mining-metallurgical institute in Annaba where cadres intended to be assigned to the rapidly developing metallurgical and mining industries, and for geological prospecting, are being trained. Let us add to that, the NOVOSTI agency went on, more than 20 technical-professional centers with a contingent of several thousand students and we shall have an idea of the considerable aid provided by the Soviet Union in solving the problem of cadres training, so important for Algeria. In the recent past the institutes and technical schools set up and operating within the framework of the cooperation program between the two countries have graduated some 5,000 engineers and technicians while the study centers have turned out more than 18,000 foremen and skilled workers.

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ALGERIA

AIR ALGERIE EXPANDING ITS EQUIPMENT, OPERATIONS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 pp 3197,3198

[Article: "Air Algerie Has Expanded Its Network, Fleet, and Traffic Considerably"]

[Excerpts] The existing network of the national company Air Algerie [Algerian Airline] has reached close to a total length of 83,000 km of which 13,000 km represent domestic lines. The airline calls at 51 cities of which 20 are in Algeria, involving mainly the large cities of the north and south.

At present the basic equipment of the Air Algerie fleet consists of 19 superjet aircraft and one turboprop plane in addition to small aircraft slated for agricultural work (14 Grumman planes) and commercial activity (18 Beechcraft planes). It should however be noted that considering its traffic which is constantly increasing and before launching its new program for the expansion of its means of exploitation the Algerian airline chartered during 1978 three Boeing 707-320 planes including one cargo version while in 1979 it chartered one Boeing 747 and three DC-8's.

Marking time in the first 5 years following the nationalization of Air Algerie, beginning in 1969 the passenger traffic witnessed remarkable growth in the sense that there was an unprecedented increase in the number of passengers using Air Algerie.

First Development Plan (1970-73): 3,314,322 passengers including 3,097,094 passengers on the regular lines (1,007,512 of these in domestic traffic).

Second Development Plan (1974-77): 7,000,000 passengers of whom 6,321,542 passengers on the regular lines (2,785,601 of these in domestic traffic).

1978: 2,411,682 passengers of whom 2,161,962 passengers on the regular lines (1,116,157 passengers, or 49 percent, in domestic traffic).

It should be mentioned in this connection, the company notes, that the fares applicable for domestic destinations are modest and have not been increased for more than a decade.

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A unique means of promoting trade, Air Algerie has assumed an increasingly important role in freight transportation. From 14,928 tons during the First 4-Year Plan for 1970-73, the latter rose to 65,672 tons during the Second Plan for 1973-1977. On its part the year 1978 saw the transportation of 25,628 tons of freight and for the year under way a projection of a minimum load of 24,687 tons is made.

At the present time a regular freight network is in existence in addition to possibilities of charter flights serving several large cities such as Paris, Marseilles, Lyons, Brussels, Geneva, London, Rome, Frankfurt, and Madrid.

Full-time employment and the promotion and training of workers have constituted the cornerstone of personnel policy at Air Algerie from the start of Algeria's independence. Whereas in 1965 foreigners still held certain key positions in the company, the Algerianization of the personnel is today in process of completion: Out of 5,703 employees 5,523 are Algerians, that is, 97 percent of the total (figures effective as of August 1979).

The breakdown of operating personnel was as follows in August 1979: Pilots, 81, including 51 Algerians; copilots, 121, including 116 Algerians; mechanics, 31, including 28 Algerians; conveyor belt operators, 6 Algerians; radio operators, 2 Algerians; noncommercial positions, 393 Algerians.

In connection with its passenger and freight transport operations, Air Algerie has been active in the agricultural-industrial sector since 1974 through the DTA [Directorate of Air Projects]. This directorate is charged with providing diversified air services and notably services of an agricultural nature, the evacuation of patients, and the transport of light freight or small groups of passengers.

To accomplish these missions the DTA has a fleet of 18 Beechcraft and 14 Grumman planes used in the industrial sector in the case of the former (air taxi and ambulance, permanently available on call for Algerian companies) and in the interest of the Ministry of Agriculture in the second case.

About 80 Algerian pilots and highly qualified personnel insure the operation of the aircraft which, in the year 1978 alone, logged 5,755 flight hours on account of industrial activities and covered 161,000 hectares of agricultural land in connection with the agrarian revolution.

Considering the strategic role of transportation facilities in nation-building, Air Algerie has assigned itself as its principal tasks the following: The extension of its network through the opening of new lines to towns of the Algerian hinterland that are not yet endowed with air service and countries that are trading partners of Algeria; the expansion of its fleet by the acquisition of new aircraft adapted to its network (the use of large-capacity aircraft on high-density traffic lines is anticipated); pursuit of the training

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program to complete the Algerianization policy relating to technical flying personnel and ground technical personnel; and finally increased assistance to the agricultural-industrial sector in order that it may fully participate in the agrarian and industrial revolutions.

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ALGERIA

BRIEFS

ALGERIAN-GDR JOINT COMMITTEE--Mourad Castel, general secretary at the Algerian Ministry of Heavy Industry, held talks in Berlin on 23 October 1979 with Horst Soelle, minister of foreign trade of the German Democratic Republic. The talks bore on the growth of economic cooperation between the two countries. Mourad Castel had arrived that same day at the head of a delegation in order to participate in the second session of the working group on industrial co-operation of the joint committee for economic, technical, and scientific cooperation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Nov 79 p 2941] 2662

AGREEMENT WITH JAMAICA--Under the terms of an agreement signed in Algiers on 29 October 1979 by Richard Fletcher, Jamaican minister of planning, and Mohamed Liassine, Algerian minister of heavy industry, Jamaica will supply to Algeria annually 150,000 tons of alumina for 10 years. These shipments are slated to supply the prospective electrolysis plant at M'Sila 250 km southeast of Algiers. A draft agreement for this purpose had been signed in Algiers on 8 February 1978 (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS [MTM] of 17 February 1978, p 532). It will finally be recalled that under the terms of a cooperation agreement signed in Moscow on 27 April 1976 by Belaid Abdesselam, at that time Algerian minister of industry and energy, the USSR must build at M'Sila an aluminum plant with an annual production capacity of 140,000 tons of aluminum (see MTM of 7 May 1976, p 1206). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Nov 79 p 2942] 2662

LOAN TO SONATRACH--The National Company for the Transport and Marketing of Hydrocarbons has just borrowed U.S. \$500 million on the international capital market. The loan and guarantee agreement was signed in London on 24 October 1979 by Mr Bengueria, representing SONATRACH, and Mahfoud Aoufi, president-general manager of the Algerian Development Bank on one hand and by the representatives of a banking consortium headed by Citicorp International Bank Limited on the other. It is noted in Algiers that "this loan of \$500 million granted for a period of 10 years including a 4-year grace period and bearing an interest rate 1 percent above that of the LIBOR [London Interbank Offered Rate], evidences the trust which the major banks place in Algeria's development." This financing, which bears on projects included in SONATRACH's investments budget for 1979, is the largest loan in Eurocurrencies ever granted to SONATRACH. The major sponsors of the loan are the following: Abu Dhabi

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Investment Company, Arab Investment Company, Arab Petroleum Investments Corporation, Bank of America International Limited, Chase Manhattan Limited, Citicorp International Group, Continental Illinois Limited, Gulf International Bank/United California Bank, Midland Bank Limited, National Westminster Bank Limited, Societe Generale, and The Sumitomo Bank Limited. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Nov 79 p 2942] 2662

LOAN TO SONELEC--A loan of U.S. \$20 million was granted by a consortium of international banks represented by the Banco Arabe Espanol SA (Aresbank) [Arab-Spanish Bank] to SONELEC [Algerian National Company for the Manufacture and Installation of Electrical and Electronic Equipment]. This loan, underwritten by the Algerian Foreign Bank, is slated to cover the purchases of equipment necessary for the start-up of a telephone complex which has just been built in the Tlemcen region with the cooperation of a Spanish firm. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Nov 79 p 3011] 2662

COOPERATION WITH MADAGASCAR--Mohamed Ben Yahai, Algerian minister of foreign affairs, and his Malagasy opposite number, Christian Remi Richard, signed in Algiers on 4 November 1979 an economic cooperation agreement between Algeria and Madagascar. "This agreement falls within the framework of the strengthening of the relations of friendship and militant solidarity linking the two countries. Furthermore, it constitutes a new milestone in the development of bilateral cooperation and has again concretized the resolve of the Algerian and Malagasy Presidents affirmed at the time of their latest meetings in Monrovia and Havana to provide a decisive impetus to this cooperation," APS wrote, commenting on the signature of this agreement. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3198] 2662

JIJEL PORT TRAFFIC--From year to year the operations of the port of Jijel have shown a substantial reactivation. The port traffic in this eastern coastal region of Algeria has had a tendency to increase, especially since the upgrading of Jijel to the rank of "wilayah" [governorate], the APS noted. It added that in 1978 109 vessels flying various flags docked in this port. Their total reached 92,396 tons compared to 70,000 tons in 1977. Imports--consisting mainly of cement, semolina, clay, leather, and miscellaneous equipment--aggregated 239,556 tons of which 121,673 tons represented semolina and 115,254 tons cement. Exports involved cork for the most part, 5,428 tons of this product being shipped to the Soviet Union, the major purchaser. The port of Jijel, which has only two docking stations, is now in the midst of extension and improvement operations. In future it will be able to accommodate five vessels of 8,000 tons each. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3198] 2662

COOPERATION WITH BENIN--An economic and financial cooperation agreement was signed in Cotonou last week at the conclusion of the meeting of the third joint Algerian-Beninese committee. It calls for a sizable increase in the volume of trade between the two countries. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Nov 79 p 2942] 2662

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LEBANON

ECONOMIC BLOCKADE REVIVES SPECULATION ABOUT PARTITION

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 22, 28 Nov 79 pp 24-26

[Article: "Number of Small States Almost Grew by One in Defiance of Franjiyyah's Blockade; Lebanese Band Sounds the Partition Beat"]

[Text] The partition tune is being heard again. The small, independent Lebanese states came close to having another small state that would have been controlled by the Lebanese Front. Why? This is because the northern state imposed an economic and an oil blockade on the central state, whereas the state of Ba'abda remained neutral.

Everything is ready for proclaiming the divided state. "Legal," "constitutional," financial, legislative, administrative, security and cultural measures and all the articles that derive therefrom are now ready for implementation with a degree of efficiency that cannot be ignored. These measures will be carried out when the time is suitable for making a specific political decision in that regard.

The aforementioned political decision must be made by the political leadership of the Lebanese Front, and it should then be supported by a military decision made by the military command which is controlled by al-Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil. This is in accordance with the political decision of President Camille Sham-um.

The argument which partition advocates offer as an excuse for going back with such vehemence and urgency to a discussion about partition and the proclamation of "independent entities" lies in the measures of the economic blockade that President Sulayman Franjiyyah imposed on the areas of the Lebanese Front in Jabal Lubnan because of the intransigence of the Phalangists and their refusal of all efforts that were made to settle the question of those who had been kidnapped in the Cedars area and also because of the conditions they imposed for negotiating this matter.

During the last 2 weeks Lebanon came very close to a catastrophe, and it did come close to facing a proclamation of the establishment of a sectarian

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entity independent of the Lebanese state whose borders would extend from the eastern area of Beirut to the borders of the areas of Bsharri, Tripoli, and Zharta in the north. This entity would include a section of the 'Alayh Hills, of northern al-Matn, of Kasrawan, a section of Jubayl, a section of the Batrun territories, in addition to the coastal strip that extends from the port of Beirut and the port of Jiniyah till the private ports in the area of Jubayl.

A map of this partition was presented at a joint meeting that was held by the leaderships of the Lebanese Front and the United Militias Force 2 days before al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil unexpectedly entered the Hotel Dieu Hospital.

Geography experts affiliated with the front drew red lines on this map to define the general borders of the aforementioned independent entity.

Partition is Reply to Blockade

Then there was a sharp debate around this subject in which it was said that President Sulayman Franjiyyah was in agreement with the legal authority and the Syrian government about tightening the economic screws on the areas of the Lebanese Front for the purpose of eliminating its influence. One can acquiesce to anything except the fact that the opportunity be made available to such a plan which would create an economic and a social situation that would destroy all the influence and the power that the Lebanese Front had built in its own areas.

Some of those who were present asked if the proclamation of the establishment of an independent entity will be a final proclamation of separation from the Lebanese state or whether it will merely be a temporary measure that would be revoked when the reasons that had led to it cease to exist.

The reply was [as follows]: when this step is announced, it may be said that it was merely a temporary measure and that it would cease to exist when the reasons that required it cease to exist. The measure may continue in fact until all the trends of the Lebanese crisis become clear. There is nothing to prevent the actual and the continued implementation of this measure until these trends do become clear. This measure may be the actual alternative to the existing regime and to the status quo that is sanctioning the new formula of the Lebanon of the future.

In the face of the wave of immoderation that prevailed over the meeting, Camille Sham-un and Pierre al-Jumayyil found themselves compelled to agree to the proposed suggestions and to ask that [officials] wait for a suitable time to announce the decisions.

According to their point of view, and this is based on what their circles stated, world public opinion would not accept partition in this sense

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simply because gas delivery to one of the areas was interrupted. Partition in its deep sense requires justifications that would be more convincing to world public opinion than the mere interruption of gas delivery to one of the areas or to one of the streets.

Retaliatory Measures

Extremists responded to this logic by saying that when such an economic blockade is imposed on the eastern areas, it is no longer important what method must be used to convince public opinion of the partition. Wars in the world began and continued for economic reasons, and when a person is given a choice between diplomatic means, self-determination, life and death, the choice he makes would be one that favors his own life rather than any other consideration.

Responding to this statement Sham'un and al-Jumayyil said that they did not totally reject this logic and that they did support it since it was inevitable that the eastern areas would arrive to it sooner or later. But Sham'un and al-Jumayyil emphasize the importance of choosing the suitable time. This, in fact, does not prevent confronting the economic blockade operation with vengeful measures which in any case need not come to the point of announcing partition.

This was the trend before the Lebanese Front resorted to its vengeful measures of interrupting water and electricity [services] and flour [deliveries] to al-Shamal and to the western areas of Beirut.

There was a sharp dispute around these points; it ended with [a decision to] postpone investigation of this subject to a subsequent session. Then al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil had a heart attack that required his hospitalization. It was said that he prolonged his convalescence so he could contribute to changing the atmosphere of urgency that was putting pressure on him to proceed in implementing decisions that he himself neither approved of nor endorsed, at least not under these circumstances.

The militias of the Lebanese Front did, however, carry out a significant portion of the disciplinary decisions. During the past week they imposed restrictions on exporting wheat and flour to the western areas and to al-Shamal, especially since they control the wheat transport routes from the granaries in the harbor. They also control the locations of most of the major flour mills which supply the city of Beirut with its food needs.

Then they drew up a military plan whose purpose was to control the stations that pumped drinking water to the different sections of the western area of Beirut and to control the power transmission lines that transmitted power to those areas and to some areas of al-Shamal.

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The State: A Neutral Observer

The ministers confessed that as of the beginning of last week, the measures of preventing the arrival of wheat and flour to al-Shamal and to the western section of Beirut have actually been implemented, albeit in a gradual manner. [The ministers said] that the failure to deal firmly with the situation will lead to the application of the remaining proposed resolutions that are being investigated.

Official voices were heard calling for the neutralization of consumer and livelihood questions and for keeping them away from the political struggle. It was the opinion of those ministers that the mere success of separating the economic part [of the situation] from the political part would keep Lebanon away from confronting the dangers of partition during these fateful stages that Lebanon and the area are facing.

A suggestion was made in the presidential palace that efforts be made to draw up a "national pact" that would require all political and party leaders to abide by the principle of separating the economic and livelihood aspects [of the situation] from the aspects of political strife. There was a stipulation that the solution begin with a step that was to be taken by the Phalangist Party. The party was to release all the citizens of the north that it had kidnapped and was holding.

It was stated here that there were new communications with his Holiness Pope John Paul the Second at the Vatican to ask him to intervene again in this crisis and put a firm end to it among the Maronites. This is because the political and economic fallout of the crisis has actually begun to threaten the Lebanese entity and the unity of the territory.

Then prominent parties in the western section [of Beirut] began to criticize sharply the use of livelihood means to achieve political gains.

Mr Walid Jumblatt discussed this subject at length at the meeting that was held last Monday evening by the leadership council of the Socialist Progressive Party. He observed that offering justifications to the extremists who are seeking partition for the purpose of announcing their steps for partition was a matter that should not go by in this manner and under this circumstance. In order for conditions to straighten out, the Maronite parties to the struggle have to abandon the methods of economic pressure. President Sulayman Franjiyyah is to suspect his economic measures against the eastern areas, and the leaders of the Lebanese Front, on their part, are to suspend their retaliatory economic measures against west Beirut and the areas of al-Shamal.

One of the ministers said that the continued application of these economic measures will bring about a change in the political positions, and the cards will be mixed. It may create an opportunity for the leaders of the

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Lebanese Front to bargain with the residents of Beirut over political positions and to attempt to establish an alliance or a dialogue that would be based on opposing the economic boycott that was originating from the north.

And now, does the spectre of partition loom anew, disguised this time in economic garb?

All the evidence indicates that the project of small sectarian states, which Israel is planning to carry out, is still present and can be implemented when Israel finds a suitable opportunity to implement it. If it is not carried out because of the economic struggle in Lebanon, there will be an attempt to carry out this project in the future for other alternative reasons.

Sham'un: We Want This Matter Settled

President Camille Sham'un himself had spoken repeatedly about the inevitability of partition. Addressing a political delegation that had visited him, he spoke about the inevitability of going back to action in accordance with the 1943 Pact: "Let us settle this matter! I want you to understand that the past is gone forever ever since the beginning of the events of 1975. The 1943 pact is no longer the subject of investigation or application. We have spent 200 years cutting each other's throats once every 10 years. We want to settle this matter. The Lebanon of the future is the Lebanon of independent states and not the unified Lebanon that you know. Why are we wasting our time?"


Some officials from Western Europe and the United States who had visited Lebanon were inclined to accept Camille Sham'un's point of view, and they submitted reports to this effect to their governments.

Today, there is open discussion in Beirut about a new proposal for a Lebanon that is made up of independent states. This would come about in case the Summit Conference that is in session in Tunisia fails to reach a solution.

The aforementioned discussion does not constitute a threat or a war of nerves. It is a factual, an open and a specific discussion which reveals the reality of the intentions that are being harbored against Lebanon.

By itself the state is powerless in front of these proposals because it is in fact too weak to prevent a power like that of the Lebanese Front from leading Lebanon, if it wishes to, into the direction of partition or towards the projects of small states.

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LEBANON

BROTHERS VIE FOR LEADERSHIP OF PHALANGIST PARTY

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 22-28 Nov 79 pp 25-26

[Article: "Cain and Abel Compete for Phalangist Leadership Following Health Crisis of al-Shaykh Pierre"]

[Text] The acute heart attack that al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil (75 years) suffered has once again raised the question of the Phalangist leadership. Since leaderships in Lebanon are inherited, the only two candidates are the sons of al-Shaykh Pierre, Amin and Bashir. Which one will win the leadership of the largest, the most organized and the most powerful of Lebanese parties?

What will happen to the Lebanese Phalangist Party if its president, al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil (75 years) were to suffer a health crisis similar to the heart attack he suffered from early this June? This heart attack required that he be moved swiftly to the Hotel Dew Hospital.

Who will rule the Phalangist Party with all its militias and its cadres if Pierre al-Jumayyil were to disappear for any reason whatsoever from the scene of events?

Will the leadership of the party be transferred in a democratic fashion from the al-Jumayyil family to one of the members of the Political Bureau without subjecting the structure of the party to destruction or to cracks?

Last week these questions and others prevailed over all other questions and concerns. They controlled the thoughts of most of the members of the Political Bureau who had worked in the party with Pierre al-Jumayyil ever since the early stages of its establishment.

The party's concern with this matter was not imminent prior to the onset of the bloody events in Lebanon. Before that, discussions during the sessions of the Political Bureau were conducted within a framework that favored democracy and sought to portray the party as "sound democratic organization" which would not worry about its survival as long as it

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relied on democratic principles in bringing about changes and development. That was in spite of the fact that al-Jumayyil, Sr has been its president for almost 40 years.

At that time the party's concern for showing its democratic [character] came to the point of making the statement that the reelection of al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil must be subject to the principles of democratic elections, even on a superficial basis.

At that time the party's elections board was invited to attend a session to elect a president from among the members of the Political Bureau. All the members of the Bureau were eligible for nomination so that al-Jumayyil would not win the elections by approbation.

Alternative Candidate Failed

To impart democracy to these elections further, a young movement emerged within the party calling for renewal. This movement nominated Phalangist Deputy Edmond Rizq to compete against al-Shaykh Pierre for the presidency of the party.

The elections were held, and, naturally, Pierre al-Jumayyil won. Afterwards the party came out in political and party circles saying, "Look how democratic we are! Look how careful we are about fair competition within the party organization! There must be a separation between the party slogan that is based on 'God, homeland and family' and liberating the party leadership from hereditary considerations."

Following this experience about whose earnestness doubts were raised at the time, matters began to return to their natural course within the party. Subsequent experiences later confirmed that it was "the family" that ruled the Phalangist Party and that the hereditary transmission of leadership and command between father, son and grandson was the accepted practice. Everything else was mere "icing on the cake" upon which no decisions or judgments were to be made.

During that stage the legacy of the al-Jumayyil family for the parliamentary seat that was vacated by the death of the late Maurice al-Jumayyil was firmly endorsed. This seat was automatically given to al-Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil, the oldest son of al-Shaykh Pierre.

This fact became even more evident when al-Shaykh Bashir, the second son, came upon the scene and took the place of William Hawi, the commander of the Phalangist militias. He appointed himself the party's military chief, and then he started a party organization that was semi-independent of his father and his older brother. He strengthened his organization with arms and men and added to it the remaining militias of the parties that fall under the banner of the Maronite Lebanese Front. His strength grew to the point that he became capable of ignoring the resolutions of the party's Political Bureau if he wanted to and of arresting his father, his brother, Amin, and anyone else of the members of the Bureau he may want to arrest if he thought he needed to take such a measure.

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Bashir al-Jumayyil made light of organized party activity to the point that he described his father's colleagues in the party's Political Bureau as "incompetents and failures." He affirmed that their decisions always came too late and were unrealistic.

A secret struggle developed between Bashir and Amin al-Jumayyil. In some cases the struggle turned into conflict because their ambitions regarding the political future were incompatible.

When Amin al-Jumayyil thought of having a dialogue with the Syrians, Bashir threatened to kill him if he were to do so.

When Amin was nominated to represent the Phalangists in a national coalition government, Bashir said that he was ready to go into government and to have a dialogue without weapons with the other party. When Bashir al-Jumayyil visited the United States, Amin rushed to make a similar tour from which he returned firmly convinced, unlike Bashir, of the benefits of having a dialogue with the Americans. Even when the party established its own radio station which is known as the Voice of Lebanon Radio, Bashir established his own radio station which is known as the Voice of Free Lebanon Radio. This is the radio station that broadcasts from al-Kaslik and is supervised and financed by the party machinery which assists Bashir in his operations.

Since the family has forced itself on the capabilities of the Phalangist Party, some members of the Political Bureau did express last week their deep concern over the dangers of a sharp struggle between Bashir and Amin over the party command as soon as al-Shaykh Pierre disappears from the scene.

Those people are saying that the outbreak of a struggle this time will subject the party as a whole to an explosion that may lead to its dissolution and to its transformation, like other parties, to several parties and reform movements that would retain nothing of its [present] structure but its name.

Al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil seems to be the most concerned party member awaiting the developments and the one who is looking the hardest for a formula that would ensure continuity for the party with the least possible losses.

Embraced by Fascist Ideas

But how did the Phalangist Party come into existence? What is the political history of this party whose Maronite character and sectarianism are ancient?

The file of al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil states that he got the idea of establishing the party in 1936 to protect "Lebanese youth" from alien

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political trends. The Lebanese Phalangist Party came into existence on 21 November 1936 when Pierre al-Jumayyil met with some of his friends, among whom were Emile Yarid, George Naqqash, Charles Hilu and others. He presented to them the idea of establishing for young people an organization whose first objective would be Lebanon; the organization would not lean towards the West nor towards the Arab countries.

The organization was given the name Phalangist because Pierre al-Jumayyil wanted it to be a semi-military organization whose character, values and objectives would be military.

But contemporary Lebanese political historians are saying that al-Jumayyil, who was a pharmacist fond of playing soccer, suddenly turned to being fond of playing politics. He was very much influenced by the Nazi and the Fascist movements--of Hitler, Mussolini and Franco--which had terrorized the world in the thirties. His "chivalry," his propensity for power and his sectarian "idealism" came together and evolved into the Lebanese Phalangist [Organization].

While the party was making preparations to celebrate its first anniversary, the mandatory government surprised the party with a presidential order in 1937 which required its dissolution. The Phalangists refused to comply with the order, and they decided to stage a protest demonstration. The demonstration proceeded towards the al-Shuhada [the Martyrs] Square--Beirut's principal square--where the demonstrators clashed with the authorities. Al-Shaykh Pierre and some of his companions who are key figures in the organization were wounded.

A general strike was announced to protest this action. This made it incumbent upon the authorities to release those who had been arrested.

The mandatory authorities closed down the offices of the Phalangist Organization three times between 1936 and 1943. The newspaper, AL-'AMAL whose publication had begun in 1939 was banned seven times until an order was issued in 1943 recognizing the Phalangist Party as a legal organization with the right to engage in legitimate party action.

On 18 July 1949, that is, 6 years after independence, officials of the administration of President Bisharah al-Khuri proceeded to dissolve the Phalangist Party and to close down its offices. The dissolution, however, lasted no more than 3 days, and the party returned to its activities after changing its name from the Phalangist Party to the wishes of the Lebanese "to change the rulers." The Phalangist Party supported the revolution, and that led to independence in 1943. Pierre al-Jumayyil was arrested several times early in the age of independence and prior to that.

Resisting Arab Character, Becoming Allied with the Government

The facts in the party's political history state that the Phalangists opposed the Arabization of Lebanon and Arab unity plans. In addition,

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the party opposed leftist ideologies--and chief among them was communism--and it even opposed liberal movements also.

The other part of the party's political history is that which includes its contemporary history. In 1958 when the popular revolution in Lebanon was breaking out, the Phalangist Party adopted a special position that was characterized by sectarianism and by support for the administration of President Camille Sham-un who was making preparations to renew his term of office against the will of the national forces. The Phalangist Party had ties with the Baghdad Pact and with the course [of action] that was led by the United States. It facilitated the process of landing American military forces on Lebanese territory following the coup that overthrew the royal regime in Baghdad.

During the administration of President Fu'ad Shihab, which was considered the golden age for the Phalangist Party, the Phalangists acquired a principal role within the framework of the political game. The party had several representatives in the Chamber of Deputies, and it took part in successive governments. It was able to establish its party and political foundations firmly, and it was gradually representing the Maronite side in the game of sectarian balance whose features became evident since the early sixties.

The Phalangist Party's attachment to the legitimate authority grew in the aftermath of the unsuccessful coup that was carried out by the National Syrian Party early in 1961.

In 1969 it was al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil and the late Maurice al-Jumayyil who represented the Phalangist Party in the government when it agreed to the Cairo Pact which regulated existing relations between the state and the Palestinian Resistance.

But the Phalangist Party has been deliberately changing its positions ever since the early seventies and has tried to refuse taking responsibility for agreeing to the Cairo Pact. Then it turned rather intensely toward strengthening its military capabilities. This included training, purchasing weapons and cooperating with the other Maronite parties to establish the militia machinery which has led and is still leading, in the name of the Maronites, the war against the Palestinian Resistance, against Arab presence and against the Arabization of Lebanon. The party is thereby opening the field for all difficult possibilities, beginning with the possibility of partitioning Lebanon and accepting the notion of cooperating with Israel. It is paving the road to the scheme of establishing small sectarian states in the area.

At any rate, the story is still beginning.

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Lebanese Facts: From Soccer to Politics

Al-Shaykh Pierre is the son of Dr Amin al-Jumayyil, the prominent Lebanese figure who early in this century sought refuge in Cairo to escape Turkish persecution.

The Cairo journey broadened the horizons of this Lebanese man of noble descent and stretched his vision beyond the horizon of the estate and the mountain. It also granted him a dear gift, the favorite of his affections, his son Pierre.

The son studied pharmacy and became fond of soccer. At first, it was a modest game, but then he was distracted by politics which progressively drew him away from his father.

The Phalangist Party is his favorite team where he is sometimes goal keeper and other times team captain. Recently he has shown a preference for the role of umpire. Sometimes when he plays that role, he uses a policeman's whistle; other times, he uses a warning siren.

His problem lies in his language. He does not understand, like or speak Arabic well unless he gets irritated; then he speaks it fluently.

He is described as a saint, but the devils of civil war have exorcised all saints and left all leaders unveiled--dear God, just as you created me. In Lebanon, Lebanese citizens prefer to see their leaders without cover.

The Phalangists have had "flies in the ointment" every happy occasion. These have been Sham'un, Franjiyyah, and the Shihabists. Everyone lost, but the Phalangist Party always scored goals for itself.

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MAURITANIA

NATION'S WITHDRAWAL FROM SAHARA LEAVES DANGEROUS VOID

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Nov 79 pp 18-19

[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "Besieged on All Sides"]

[Text] At the end of October, Dr Ba Oumar, minister of rural development, called newsmen together in Nouakchott to declare Mauritania a "disaster area." The agricultural situation is as catastrophic as it was during the big drought in 1973. Paradoxically enough, it was the early rains in June that destroyed the plantings, while the Senegal River, which has always irrigated the south, the country's primary agricultural region, experienced one of the lowest floods of the century this year.

This harsh test worsens a financial situation that is always cause for concern and joins a malaise in interethnic relations that delayed the opening of schools until the beginning of November. In order to restore calm, it was decided to "radicalize" the teaching of Arabic solely in the north, where there are practically only Arabic-speaking people. In the south, Arabic will be the second language after French, for a transitional period of 6 years. This decision fits into a vast program of decentralization marked by the establishment of regional councils which are to take over a large share of the management of their district. These measures were drawn up by the Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN) at marathon meetings from 8 to 18 October, meetings devoted to the country's essential problems and to the real or supposed threats facing it. Along the same line of ideas, in the month of October, upper-level personnel and former ministers were arrested, transferred and assigned to places located some distance away from Nouakchott. The most spectacular arrests were those of Ahmed Ould Mohamed Salah, several times minister under Mokhtar Ould Daddah, and the former head of diplomacy, Hamdi Ould Mouknass. The former was apprehended inside the Chinguetti Mosque. The second, already under house arrest in Nouadhibou, was transferred to the region of Tidjikja, in the central region of the country. His friends are seriously concerned over his health because in recent months, he had been under medical care.

The arrests took place the day after the departure of Mokhtar Ould Daddah, who left Nouakchott on 3 October to receive care in France (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 980). Supporters of the old regime must not harbor too much hope. At

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any rate, these arrests are linked to the climate of uncertainty reigning in the country, made worse by foreign interference in national politics.

It was useless for Mauritania to stage the coup d'etat on 10 July 1978 in order to extricate itself from the affair in the Sahara. It was useless for it to sign, on 5 August 1979 in Algiers, a peace agreement with the POLISARIO. It remains mired down in the tensions hanging over this entire region of northwestern Africa, tensions which since the fall of Mokhtar Ould Daddah have caused three coups d'etat or palace revolutions in Nouakchott. The fact is that the military men themselves had divergent opinions: Some wanted to join the search for an overall peace without going back on friendships or alliances; others wanted to go it alone, at the risk of passing into the "other camp." The supporters of the second solution won out after the tragic death of Lt Col Ahmed Ould Bousseif in a plane crash near Dakar at the end of May 1979. There resulted a new shakeup and new competition between foreign influences, with everyone trying to get Mauritania trying to line up on his side.

The Algiers agreement, which gave to the POLISARIO Tiris el-Gharbia, that part of the Western Sahara attributed to Mauritania by the tripartite Madrid agreements (14 November 1975), was called "capitulation" by Morocco and even by many Mauritaniens, who were quickly accused by the government of being "agents" of Morocco. Whence the arrests, including that of the former deputy from Dakhla, Mohamed Lamine Ould Hormallah, who was imprisoned at Salibaby in the far south of Mauritania. Since Morocco occupied Tiris el-Gharbia in order not to give it to the POLISARIO, Hormallah's arrest created more tension between Rabat and Nouakchott.

It was at the time of this new crisis with Morocco that the Mauritanian prime minister, Lt Col Khouna Ould Haidalla, arriving in Paris in September, made an appeal to France. The result was that at the beginning of November, it was decided to send to Nouadhibou, a port in the north, 200 French paratroopers to protect the "1960 borders."

They would immediately have to deal with the Moroccans, it would appear, but the actual situation is more complex and the arrival of the first French soldiers was followed by the replacement of the governor of Nouadhibou, Ahmed Ould Bneidjara, pro-POLISARIO and one of the brains behind the coup d'etat of 10 July. It is true that he had certain difficulties with the local population and some tribal chiefs. France's objective was mainly to destroy the growing influence exercised over Mauritania by Algiers and the POLISARIO, the latter having followers and sympathizers within the Mauritanian government, even among the military.

The appeal to the French nevertheless gave rise to serious controversies among the members of the CMSN. For some, a step had been taken 10 years backward, to the time of the unequal military agreements, the reign of MIFERMA [Iron-Mining Company of Mauritania] and the CFA franc. Since 1972, Mauritania has gradually freed itself from that subordination, but without

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an abrupt break with France. It has also drawn closer to the Arab world, while avoiding excessively strong tensions with countries in the Southern Sahara, such as Senegal.

But the map of the region has changed greatly and Mauritania has been caught up in an enormous whirlwind it did not foresee and whose consequences it cannot always predict. An essential piece on the playing board of this northwestern Africa by virtue of its million square kilometers and its vast Atlantic coastline, despite the precarious Algiers peace accords, Mauritania today is besieged on all sides, by the "greats" and the "not so great."

As a result, certain leaders, including those who have negotiated with the POLISARIO the most since 10 July 1978, have not accepted the 5 August accord because Mauritania has stated that it no longer "had anything to do with the Sahara." And yet, that same Western Sahara is, because of the whims of the colonial borders, practically imbedded in Mauritania and, from the Zouerate iron mines to the port of Nouadhibou, runs the richest part of the country.

In 1976, the POLISARIO took Zouerate as its target in order to make Mauritania capitulate and better isolate Morocco. By abruptly leaving the Sahara, Mauritania has created a dangerous void. The evacuation of Tiris el-Gharbia has even brought the battlefield closer to Zouerate and Nouadhibou, two centers of vital importance to the country's economy. Will it remain outside the war, when the POLISARIO continues its steady buildup and constantly harasses the Moroccan Army further and further south?

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MOROCCO

EFFECTS OF WAR ON ECONOMY DISCUSSED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Nov 79 p 30

[Article by Francisco Vergara: "Zero Growth"]

[Text] In spite of its affirmed desire to stimulate the economy the government appears to be forced to follow a policy of austerity. During the implementation of the plan 1973-1977 investments increased annually by 46 percent. In 1977 they reached 35 percent of the national income. A historical record. Just as ambitious as its predecessor, the 5-year plan of 1978-1982 was abandoned as early as 1978 and replaced by a transitional 3-year plan which is an austerity plan. Exports hardly covered 41 percent of the imports in 1977 (against 80 percent in 1973). Mostly due to a tripling of imports, to persistently weak exchange rates and to the demand for phosphates.

To begin with the budget of 1978 was reduced by 10 percent with a reduction of public investments of 30 percent but with an increase of running expenses of 5 percent all the same. The 1979 budget has been built on the same model with stagnant investments.

Industry is hit most. Public financing in industrial investments changes from \$75 million for the first trimester of 1977 to 9, then to 4 million respectively for the same periods in 1978 and 1979. Private investments also, very dependent on state orders, fall by 53 percent in 1978 and by 24 percent during the first trimester of 1979.

This slump in investment is felt in business: 54 percent for the electric industry in 1978; 35 to 40 percent in metallurgy; 20 percent in building. Cement consumption (+12.5 percent a year between 1970 and 1978) stagnates in 1979. The assembly of utilization vehicles decreased by 45 percent in 1978 and should fall by 20 percent more in 1979. All this brings grave difficulties for subcontractors and foundries. The main foundry of Morocco closed its door in 1978. The financing of large projects of rural improvement which the transition plan foresaw instead of new industrial investments was assured of only 28 percent in 1978. The rate of growth fell to 3.1 percent in 1978 against 6.8 percent during the 1973-77 plan.

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As to imports, they diminished by 14 percent, mostly because of the fall in purchases of equipment. This small success however did not last and during the first semester of 1979 imports rose by 3.8 percent. In September the government added to imports subject to control those of raw materials and machines. Indeed, boilers and other mechanical engines weigh heavily among purchases abroad. "Limiting imports or limiting economic activity?" asks LE CEDIES on 29 September, the employers' journal. The editorial of the *Matin du Sahara*, a pro-government daily, gives the heading: "Restrictions and Paralysis."

Employers, trade unions and opposition parties who approve the Sahara policies of Hassan II criticize the economic policies, fearing that it aggravates unemployment (1.2 million of unemployed in 1978) and erodes the social climate in industry (916 strikes in 1978 against 780 in 1977).

The future is not bright either: more expensive imports (oil and cereals mostly); higher interest rates on loans. Industrial exports (textiles) are hurt by the protectionism of the developed countries and fruit and vegetables exports must compete with other African and Mediterranean countries.

The annual cost of the war in the Sahara (\$1460 million) is comparable to the commercial deficit of 1978 (1564 million). The 50 Mirages bought from France cost \$650 million; the radar systems bought from Westinghouse \$250 millions. With the exception of a big reduction of the military budget which seems excluded, the braking of activity appears to be the only means likely to reduce the trade deficit. Or else the Moroccan economy is transformed into a war economy.

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TUNISIA

BELGIAN-TUNISIAN COOPERATION TO DEVELOP IN SEVERAL AREAS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Nov 79 p 2943

[Article: "New Plans for Belgian-Tunisian Cooperation"]

[Text] In cooperation with the FEB [Federation of Belgian Enterprises] Tunisia will organize on 28 November 1979 within the framework of the "Midest," an international forum of subcontractors being held in Brussels, a day for the promotion of investments slated to make better known the possibilities offered by Tunisia in this field, particularly thanks to the provisions of the law of April 1972 which, in order to favor the establishment of job-creating export industries, provides extremely advantageous terms for investors. A large number of Belgian firms have already taken advantage of these opportunities to set up shop in Tunisia. But it is certain that Tunisian-Belgian cooperation has other potentials to develop.

The recent 13th meeting in Tunis of the joint Belgian-Tunisian committee re-emphasized it. On that occasion the AGEFI [Economic and Financial Agency] of Brussels, recalling that bilateral cooperation between Belgium and Tunisia had emanated from a general agreement signed on 15 July 1964, stated that "since then Tunisia has changed a lot. The country has made progress, has insured uninterrupted economic development for itself and is now approaching the 'take-off' point proper. The means used to achieve this goal are based on the following premises:

Maintaining a high investment level by favoring productive investments;

Endowing the national economy with a rate of rapid growth and striving to control the employment problem;

Realizing self-sufficiency in food, notably in staple agricultural products; and

Pursuing regional development."

Over the years, AGEFI added, Belgium has had to adjust its cooperation to the orientations and general evolution of Tunisia. Most of the Belgian projects being implemented in Tunisia come to term in 1980.

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Tunisia has submitted a series of new plans including the following:

1. SONAPROV [National Food Production Company] and a botanical-pharmaceutical laboratory; the supply of equipment and the assignment of experts for the treatment, generalization, and control sectors.
2. Advanced Textile Institute at Ksar Hellal: Establishment of a "maintenance" workshop, assignment of an expert, and supply of capital goods.
3. INAT [National Institute of Agronomy in Tunisia]: This project whose term would in the normal course of events conclude in 1981, has been extended by 3 years. INAT trains agronomists. Belgium supplies personnel, teaching and scientific materials, and insures the training of Tunisian counterparts.
4. Filtering of the residual waters of the paper pulp plant in Kasserine: Undertaking of a study on the type of treatment and the equipment to be used. Belgium will also provide capital equipment and insure the assembly and putting into service of the facility.
5. API [Agency for the Promotion of Investments]: Appointment of an expert charged with promoting Belgian investments in Tunisia.
6. Training Center for Port Projects: Study and laying out of this center.
7. The scholarship program for 1980 calls for the following quotas: 40 study scholarships and 80 internships. Tunisia furthermore was granted a government-to-government loan of 50 million Belgian francs.

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TUNISIA

NEW POSTELECTORAL CHANGES VIEWED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 21 Nov 79 p 43

[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "After the Elections: Taking Stock"]

[Text] In the space of 2 months, some striking political facts have shaken many convictions and confirmed that President Habib Bourguiba remains incontestably master of the game.

The post congressional period might have led to believe that some snags had blemished the confidence shown to Mr Nouria by the head of state for the last 10 years. Did not the prime minister and secretary general of the PSD (Social Democratic Party) entrust to others the organization of the 10th Congress (5-9 September), particularly to the military establishment led by Mr Abdallah Farhat, at that time defense minister?

The government formed after the legislative elections of 4 November on the contrary strengthens the position of the same Hedi Nouria. The prime minister has at his disposal a cabinet marked more than ever by the seal of technology and shorn, after gradual eliminations, of too forceful personalities. The last victim of this purge has been Mr Abdallah Farhat, still considered the country's strong man on the eve of the congress. (J.A. No 977) His disgrace took place by stages... so as not to give support to false rumors of conspiracy. As a matter of fact, in Algiers, the day after his dismissal from the Defense Ministry post (12 September) an opponent, Brahim Ben Tobal, made a declaration alleging a military plot. This real bombshell petered out but a certain press, particularly in the Middle East, published it as headline and without the slightest verification.

Now, Bourguiba kept Abdallah Farhat not only in the Political Bureau but also in the legislative body on top of the list for the ward of Tunis-South. Habits and influences were again working in the party machine and, apparently, there were irregularities. When the results proclaimed did not appear to correspond to the true number of votes obtained by the former minister, Bourguiba cried out: "Really Abdallah Farhat has not learned anything." And the very next day after the elections he fired him from the Political Bureau.

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The president also took advantage of these last 2 months to sound out the army. And some higher officers even protested against the fact that their former boss (Abdallah Farhat) made use of them, when he organized the congress, in connection with his open struggle against another strongman of the country, the PSD director Mohamed Sayah.

Mr Abdallah Farhat's election was not the only one that was contested and suspected of fraud. Other cases have been reported in Tunis, in Monastir, in Kairouan and particularly in El Jem, a small town famous for its Roman amphitheater. There, the figures broadcast in the early hours of the morning of 5 November gave the election to Mr Chaabane Belhareth, a young teacher secretary general of the PSD in the ward. According to the final results Mr M'Hammed Sfar, a business man of the county town became deputy. At the news big and small get into the street. The group grows. There is a demonstration, then a riot. Police forces of adjoining towns are called for reinforcement. El Jem is encircled, demonstrators are arrested.

The structure of the new government visibly reflects the wish to eradicate these "howlers." Some ministries recovered their incumbents: Foreign Affairs, Justice, Finance, Trade, Planning, National Education, Youth and Sports. Others changed: Dr Dhaoui Hannablia leaves Interior (for Health) and is replaced by Mr Othman Kechrid--up to now entrusted with relations with Parliament and known as a great administrator--as well as Mr Rachid Sfar who replaced Mr Abdallah Farhat at the Defense Department after his dismissal. Therefore there has been a depolitization, some would say a "depolicing" of the key ministries: Defense and Interior.

Another operation of "smoothing out": Mr Fouad Mbazaa, a dyed in the wool liberal leaves Health for the Ministry of Information and Culture where the methods of his predecessor Mr Mohammed Yalaoui riled the intellectuals. The influence of Mr Nouira is felt in the "technological slant" of several other members of the government. Thus Mr Amor Rourou, oil engineer becomes minister of industry, mines and energy. While Mr M'Hammed Ali Souissi, a young mathematician out of the School for Bridges and Highways goes to Equipment and Mr Lassaad Ben Osman, hydraulics engineer returns to Agriculture, leaving Transport and Communications to Mr Hassan Belkhodja (formerly Industry, Mines and Energy).

The biggest surprise is the return to Social Affairs of Mr Mohamed Ennaceur, a specialist of Labor Law and native of El Jem who had resigned from that post in December 1977 in protest against the social policies of the government. His return makes one think of a new overture towards trade unions and who knows even of changes at the head of the directing team of the General Union of Tunisian Workers. Anyway, Tunisia has no elections due in the immediate future.

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TUNISIA

BRIEFS

PRIORITY TO IRRIGATION--The agriculture and fishing sector has to make in the course of the Fifth [Development] Plan for 1977-81 500 million Tunisian dinars of investments at current prices, that is, nearly 12 percent of total investments. This total, the official document notes, would increase the rate of investment from 50 million dinars a year during the Fourth Plan for 1973-76 to 100 million dinars a year during the Fifth Plan. Agricultural hydraulics will have 50 percent of the investments earmarked to it with a total of 244 million dinars for the 5-year period. The Tunisian daily L'ACTION recently recalled that these investments will concern mainly the realization of the first stage of the Master Plan of the Waters of the North (100 million dinars) for an aggregate cost of 140 million dinars. This project will make it possible to supply the principal urban centers of Tunis, Hammamet, and Nabeul with drinking water, to irrigate 10,600 hectares (5,200 hectares at Medjez El Bab, Testour, and 5,400 hectares at Cap Bon), and to protect 6,000 hectares of citrus fruits. Furthermore, construction of the Bourguiba dam which will protect the Kairouan plain while laying out irrigated areas is already well advanced. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Nov 79 p 2943]

SAUDI LOAN--During a ceremony held on 27 October 1979 at the head office of the Islamic Bank in Jidda, Kacem Bousnina, Tunisian ambassador in Saudi Arabia, and Dr Ahmad Muhammad 'Ali, president of that bank, signed an agreement for a loan granted to Tunisia by the bank. This loan for U.S. \$6 million (nearly 2.5 million Tunisian dinars) will be used for the realization of a project for supplying the city of Sfax with drinking water. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Nov 79 p 2943] 2662

LOAN FORM BAD--G.E. Gondwe, acting president of the BAD [African Development Bank] and Moncef Kedadi, Tunisian ambassador in Abidjan, signed on 26 October 1979 a guarantee agreement under whose terms the bank will grant a loan for 2.161 billion CFA francs (approximately 4 million Tunisian dinars) to SONEDE [National Water Exploitation and Distribution Company] for the water supply project of the Gabes industrial zone. The loan is reimbursable in 17 years. The project involves the boring and outfitting at Chott El Fedjej of six artesian wells, the construction of a collection network 22 km long linking the wells to the reservoirs, the laying out of two reservoirs, and the installation of a water supply line 20 km long. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Nov 79 p 2943] 2662

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MEDICAL COOPERATION WITH PRC--Ismail Khalil, director general of the international cooperation department at the Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Tsui Tsien, ambassador of the People's Republic of China in Tunis, last week proceeded with the signature of a technical cooperation agreement. The latter calls for the assignment in Tunisia of a Chinese team made up of 19 members which will help provide medical coverage of the Jendouba region. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Nov 79 p 2943] 2662

SOLAR ENERGY SEMINAR--A seminar on solar energy was held in Tunis on 29 and 30 October 1979. Organized jointly by MTEG [Tunisian Gas and Electric Company], the French company ELF-Aquitaine [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France-Aquitaine], and the Tunisian Center of Research in Rural Engineering, the seminar made it possible for the participants to exchange views on various experiments pursued in Tunisia, France, Mali, Niger, and Senegal in the field of solar energy exploitation, to survey the various techniques used so far, and to visit the small-scale irrigation projects at Hendi Zitoun, an area in Kairouan Governorate, where an experiment in the use of solar energy for irrigation is under way. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Nov 79 p 3011] 2622

SAUDI LOAN FOR COFIT--A loan agreement involving 75 million Saudi Arabian riyals (approximately 9 million Tunisian dinars) was signed in Tunis on 29 October 1979 between COFIT [Financial, Real Estate, and Tourist Company] and the National Commercial Bank of Jidda in the presence of Salah Mbarka, general secretary at the Tunisian Ministry of Finance, and 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Uthman, charge d'affaires at the Saudi Arabian embassy in Tunis. This loan, granted at an interest rate of 7.75 percent and reimbursable in 7 years, is slated to finance tourist and real estate projects for commercial use included within the framework of the targets of the Fifth Plan (1977-81). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Nov 79 p 3011] 2662

CONTRACT WITH FRENCH FIRMS--SAT [French Telecommunication Corporation] received from the SNCFT [Tunisian National Railroad Company] an order worth 20 million French francs for laying out telecommunication lines. What is involved, a SAT communique noted, is wiring slated to help the installation of signals necessary for the exploitation of the railroad lines of the SNCFT and the flow of telephone traffic for account of the Tunisian Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications. The contract awarded to SAT following an international invitation to bid. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3199] 2662

STIA-RVI AGREEMENT--A cooperation agreement between STIA [Tunisian Automobile Company] and RVI [Renault Industrial Vehicles Company] was signed in Tunis on 7 November 1979 by Mokhtar Cheniti, president-general manager of STIA, and Mr Zannotti, president-general manager of RVI. According to a communique by the French firm this agreement calls for the supply to Tunisia of average-sized trucks and others over 10 tons, more specifically for the annual

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delivery beginning in 1980 of from 400 to 500 vehicles to be assembled at the Sousse plant in Tunisia that is, an amount of from 40 to 50 million French francs. This agreement covering a 5-year period, it was noted in Tunis, spells out industrial cooperation of a nature to favor the increase in the rate of integration in national production. This cooperation, it was also noted, will be implemented by technical and technological assistance to STIA and its subcontractors and by the laying out of new industrial production units such as the plant for the production of automobile vehicle radiators and of systems for the raising of drivers' cabs. In a speech which he delivered on this occasion Slaheddine Ben M'Barek, Tunisian minister of commerce, who was at the time acting minister of industry, mines, and energy, and who chaired the ceremony at this contract's signature, expressed gratification at the new kind of cooperation "which calls for gradual industrial integration over a 5-year period," he noted. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3199] 2662

NEW PORTS--The JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE TUNISIENNE [Official Gazette] of 23-26 October 1979 published invitations to bid relating to the construction of port infrastructural facilities at the coastal fishing ports of Sidi Daoud, Beni Khair, Hergha (constituting the second group), Zaret, Ajim, and Bou Grara (the third group). The realization of these ports is financed by the World Bank within the framework of a coastal fishing development project in Tunisia. As regards the second fishing project, invitations to bid will be issued by the General Commissioner's Office for Fishing (Ministry of Equipment located at Cite Jardins, Tunis) for the supply of 430 diesel marine engines slated to equip fishing craft 11.25 meters and 13.80 meters in over-all length and which will be assigned in several lots, namely, 400 engines of 50 horsepower and 30 engines of 100 horsepower. Specifications for same will be available in December 1979. Financing for the order is provided by the World Bank, a loan of U.S. \$28.5 million having been approved for the project aimed at increasing the production of coastal fishing and the income of fishermen. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3199] 2662

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

UAE IS CONCERNED ABOUT FEDERAL ASSIMILATION, GULF SECURITY

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 30 Nov-6 Dec 79 pp 25-26

[Article: "The UAE: Security is a Gulf Issue, Not an American One"]

[Text] There are two concerns preoccupying the UAE these days. One is the achievement of federal assimilation, now that "the right shaykh was put in the right place" last June and Shaykh Rashid ibn Sa'id Al Maktum became responsible for unity on top of his responsibility for his emirate, Dubai. The second concern is security, because of the increased apprehension since the recent Iranian-American crisis broke out.

Do the Gulf evenings give one the impression that this area has become a serious pit of tension in the world? Not at all. Abu Dhabi, the desert town, has grown so rapidly that its outskirts plunge into the sandy shores over which the waves of the Gulf play.

The streets are straight and clean, the buildings huge and modern. Green bushes and flowers grow down the middle of the streets and squares, stretching their heads up and flaunting their colors as if they cared little for the shifting world of burning sand behind them.

Activity is lively and incessant, but everything is done calmly without shouting. The people are polite and cultured wherever you meet them. City life has not stripped them of their generosity, kindness, friendliness and hospitality.

Life goes on easily and pleasantly. The wealth which has descended so suddenly has been channeled and distributed to education, health, electricity, water, prosperity and modern administration.

Just as backwardness has its problems, advancement also has problems--bigger ones. The UAE is a developing nation which has made much progress in development, industry and commerce. But there remain other steps which it must take decisively and rapidly.

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Is the Federation Progressing Towards Assimilation?

The hope is stronger today than at any time past that this federation, which consists of seven emirates, will become more cohesive, solid and assimilated, especially now that it has become possible to overcome the main difference between the two largest emirates. Last June Ruler of Dubai Shaykh Rashid ibn Sa'id Al Maktum took over the post of prime minister, so as to be able to coordinate in a broader manner with Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan, ruler of Abu Dhabi, the richest emirate, and also president of the federation.

What the new government has to do now is accelerate its steps towards an assimilated unity, not just on the administrative level but also on the levels of economic integration and industrial, construction and development coordination. Money should not be squandered on facilities like airports, ports or installations which can be dispensed with in one emirate as long as there is a similar one nearby in another emirate.

Furthermore, assimilation will never be serious as long as the armed forces, now numbering 22,000 soldiers, are not merged. Loyalty must be to the central state, not to the emirates and small enclaves. In the final analysis, a unified army will be the crucible in which all the regional disparities and tribal, clannish feelings will be melted down. The army is for one family--the family of the sole homeland, state and president.

Oil--a Blessing or an Affliction?

Are UAE citizens optimistic or pessimistic about their aspirations towards unity?

In fact, they are a little bit of both. They are cautiously and closely observing, hoping that Shaykh Rashid will fulfil the hopes pinned on him now that he has taken over the federal prime ministry, and that he will benefit from the rare opportunity of having Shaykh Zayid at the head of the government, with his strong aspirations towards unity and with the resources of his emirate, the greater part of which are used for federal expenses, financing its organizations, and supporting assimilation.

Perhaps oil, the main national resource, will help speed up the assimilation. Whenever the UAE citizen, be he ruler or ordinary citizen, reflects on the fact that this resource is short-lived, he must automatically realize that unity is the only sure protection for the distant future.

Similarly, when it is said that at the present rate of production the country's oil reserves will last more than 50 years, he must also realize that this factor will assist rapprochement and assimilation, while its export revenues will be ample for the expenses and financing of unity projects.

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Welcoming the Deposition of the Shah

The Shah of Iran's deposition early this year helped overcome many of the obstacles and disagreements among emirate rulers. The shah had played the part of saboteur of the unity and assimilation of the emirates, and his imperial aspirations and dreams had thrown a pall over this nascent Arab state.

Although there are no sectarian minorities to be negatively or positively attracted by the events in Iran, nonetheless the emirates welcomed the ascent of a firmly-believing leader to the seat of power there. But Ayatollah Khomeini has been unable to control the destinies of the government, because of increasing unrest there. That is to say, the instability in Iran is pushing wave after wave of negative effects across the Gulf to its other shores.

Perhaps the present Iranian-American crisis is a strong proof which the rulers and citizens of the emirates cite as validation for their viewpoint and conviction, as well as the tensions caused by the ayatollah's statements about the Arabism of the Gulf.

Therefore, the UAE is looking to neighboring Arab states to ensure permanent security based on Arab power. The security of the Gulf states is first and last Arab security. It is not the responsibility of America or the Soviet Union.

On this basis, the UAE is expressing its anxiety about American movements near their shores. On the other hand, the officials welcome any step which will help establish Arab security coordination.

Last October's al-Ta'if meeting of the foreign ministers of the region's states resulted in an important step on the level of exchanging security data among the concerned regional agencies.

A Balanced Foreign Policy

Except for the concern over an assimilated federation and over regional security, there are no pressing problems imposing themselves on officials here. The state maintains normal, if not excellent, relations with its Arab sisters, regardless of the differences in regime and ideology.

The emirates, led by Shaykh Zayid, strongly and resolutely supported Arab solidarity against the Camp David plan and its resultant separate agreements between al-Sadat's Egypt and Israel. In so doing it agreed with the more radical Arab states like Iraq and Algeria.

It is also coordinating with its big Gulf sister Saudi Arabia, on the level of oil and the direction of price and production policy. It also has firm relations with the rest of the Gulf states.

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Perhaps the most credit for that should go to the leader who made the arrangements for this newly independent (only 8 years ago) Arab state. Shaykh Zayid is very popular among all the UAE citizens, and there is complete conviction that the man has sincere intentions and is working for the sake of everything which will bring the Arabs closer together--not to mention his basic position as a factor of stability and equilibrium in his country and the entire Gulf region.

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WESTERN SAHARA

OPERATION 'OUHOUD' UNLIKELY TO ATTAIN MILITARY OBJECTIVES

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 Nov-9 Dec 79 pp 24-25

[Article by Hassen Zenati: "The Colonial Logic"]

[Text] Another military search has been attempted in the Western Sahara, ordered by King Hassan II himself. One more, a repeat of 1975, 1976, 1977. It will undoubtedly not be the last if the war continues, even if, judging by the cost of wasted fuel alone, the efficiency-price ratio seems exorbitant.

In Morocco, military searches are actually part of the martial ritual of the monarchy, which uses them much more like military parades, in order to pump up the troops, than like war operations strictly speaking. Since 1975, people have finally grown used to these interminable military convoys stretching out over dozens of kilometers, periodically combing the desert in search of the elusive "rebels." They circle a few times and leave, with the satisfaction of having done their duty (and saved their own lives), but carrying with them the bitter idea that they will soon have it to do all over again.

Seen from this angle, Operation Ouhoud -- a usurped Christian name -- is certainly not any different from those that preceded it. Or perhaps it is. It is different by virtue of the number of men poured into it (some 10,000) and the quantity and quality of equipment supplied: 1,500 combat vehicles and machines, ground-to-ground and ground-to-air missiles, BM-14's, tanks with six 20-mm tubes, armored VAB squadrons, F-1 Mirage jets, F-5's, helicopters, and so on. This is a substantial amount of firepower that at first glance seems disproportionate with the stated objective: destroying the logistical bases of the POLISARIO in the Western Sahara and forcing it to seek refuge elsewhere. Let it be said in passing that this is a substantial admission that has gone somewhat unnoticed, inasmuch as for the first time, an official Moroccan authority -- and what authority: the king himself! -- has recognized that the Moroccan army of occupation is not being attacked from a foreign base, but from within the very occupied territory itself!

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For the rest, Operation Ouhoud essentially obeys the same inoperative logic as the spectacular operations that preceded it and is part of the same line of failure already tried by the colonizers in all the colonial messes of the century. Once the road roller is gone, the guerrilla soldier goes calmly back into the territory to await the next coming in a few weeks or months. In this case, the speed of the war operations does not depend on the staff of the Royal Armed Forces (FAR) or on King Hassan II, but on the POLISARIO, which retains the military initiative and mastery of the terrain.

The paradox is that the sweepers know this because they themselves have experienced the same thing, without counting the lessons of colonial military history. And yet, they persist and in the final analysis, one can accept their persistence. On a strictly psychological level, a sweep is not lacking in effects: review of the troops in new fatigue dress, officers' decorations, epic accents, mutual congratulations and an equipment fetish. In the Sahara in particular, the troops, doomed to immobility for months on end, are kept in a constant state of anguish and fear of a surprise attack on the garrison, while being given the impression of mobility.

But from a political -- or rather, politician's -- point of view, it provides a relative diversion: "It is the beginning of the end for the POLISARIO!" proclaims the Moroccan press (both the majority and the opposition), in a single voice, that of the all-powerful master. This is reminiscent of Robert Lacoste, the muscular governor of "French Algeria," announcing the "final quarter hour of the rebellion in Algeria." Twenty-five years later, the same colonial impasses give rise to the same verbal delirium.

Actually, something like this is needed in order to galvanize, even for a time, troops that are tired and virtually defeated, in order to raise morale, divert and breed patience in a people that long ago lost hope of the astounding promises of the "Saharan Eldorado." For if the war in the desert costs the royal budget \$1 billion annually, it is the poor people already overburdened with taxes who are paying for the disaster from which as usual, the greedy elements of the Court are profiting. Something like this was needed in order for King Hassan II to give himself the illusion of power at a time when his last friends know that his feet are of clay. The CIA only said out loud what everyone in American and Western political circles were already thinking. After all, is Operation Ouhoud's sound of marching not destined for the Moroccan lobby in Washington -- like Tel-Aviv's lobby -- in order to encourage it to wage the battle in the Senate for the supplying of more American weapons to Morocco? What therefore emerges from this succession of events is that King Hassan II's current policy in the Western Sahara is nothing more than visual flight and escape.

Witness Box

Militarily speaking, whatever the scope of Operation Ouhoud -- Rabat is rather discreet about its results -- and no matter how long it lasts,

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it is already certain that the military objective assigned to it will not be achieved: dislodging the Saharan soldiers from the positions won at the price of innumerable sacrifices over the past 4 years. Armies pass and the "rebels" remain; it is a well-known fact.

On the diplomatic level, Moroccan reverses are turning into disaster. No government dares any longer to publicly sustain Moroccan claims in the name of a so-called "historic right." While 35 countries already recognize the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic [SDAR], the three main pillars of what is called the international community: the OAU, the group of nonaligned nations and the United Nations, have reaffirmed in nearly identical terms the Saharan people's right to self-determination and are asking Morocco to put an end to the occupation of the territory it annexed by force in 1975. If it keeps its promise (Who knows? In July, 48 chiefs of state were "fleeced" in Monrovia by Hassan II's turnabout), of going to the meeting of the OAU Committee of Wise Men called for 27 November in Monrovia by President William Tolbert, it is certain that Morocco will once again be put on the defensive, in the witness box.

Whatever last minute maneuvers will be resorted to by the Moroccan diplomats in order to duck the subject -- the Conference of Nations Bordering on the Sahara or other subterfuges -- they will probably go to Canossa. That would still be the most honorable solution for a regime with its back against the wall.

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